\u3cem\u3eTyrrell & Nelson v. BNSF\u3c/em\u3e: Jumping the Tracks Between FELA, \u3cem\u3eDaimler\u3c/em\u3e, and Consent by Keyes, Marin
Montana Law Review Online 
Volume 76 Article 31 
12-16-2015 
Tyrrell & Nelson v. BNSF: Jumping the Tracks Between FELA, 
Daimler, and Consent 
Marin Keyes 
Alexander Blewett III School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr_online 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Marin Keyes, Oral Argument Review, Tyrrell & Nelson v. BNSF: Jumping the Tracks Between FELA, Daimler, 
and Consent, 76 Mont. L. Rev. Online 240, https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr_online/vol76/iss1/31. 
This Oral Argument Review is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review Online by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at 
University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
240 MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE Vol. 76 
  
Recap; Tyrrell & Nelson v. BNSF: Jumping the Tracks Between 
FELA, Daimler, and Consent 
 
Marin Keyes  
No. DA 14-0825 Montana Supreme Court 
 
Oral Argument: Wednesday, December 9, 2015 at 9:30 a.m. in the 
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice 
Building, Helena, Montana. 
 
For purposes of oral argument, the Court stated BNSF would be the 
appellee and Tyrrell & Nelson the appellants. This is a change from the 
designations used in the appellate briefs and despite a motion made by 
BNSF.1 
 
I. CHRISTOPHER MORELAND FOR APPELLANTS 
 Mr. Moreland started his opening argument by repeating a key 
fact: Tyrrell and Nelson brought their claims under the Federal 
Employers’ Liability Act (FELA). Mr. Moreland did not advance too far 
in his argument before the justices launched into a thorough examination 
of § 56 of FELA.2 The justices began by asking Mr. Moreland to address 
BNSF’s argument that § 56 is a venue statute conferring only concurrent 
subject matter jurisdiction to states. Mr. Moreland opined there is a 
fundamental disconnect in a statute conferring both subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction to federal courts but conferring only subject matter 
jurisdiction to state courts. He went on to say § 56 is a venue statute, but 
jurisdiction is assumed in a location where venue is proper. In a point 
Mr. Moreland made several times, no one is disputing this case could 
have been filed in Montana federal court, thus it is a situation akin to one 
where forum non conveniens is used. In other courts, forums non 
conveniens is available when jurisdiction and venue are present in a 
court, but a different forum is more appropriate for the disposition of the 
case. 
Mr. Moreland espoused the view that BNSF would be subject to 
general personal jurisdiction even if § 56 did not apply. At various times 
in his argument and rebuttal Mr. Moreland referenced BNSF’s 
substantial and expanding business activities in Montana. The Court 
                                           
1 Mot. to Consolidate and Set Briefing Schedule, 4, Mar. 3, 2015, DA 14-0825. 
2 45 U.S.C. § 56 (2012) (stating “[u]nder this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of 
the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action 
arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action. The 
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this chapter shall be concurrent with that of the 
courts of the several States.”). 
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questioned how Mr. Moreland distinguished this case from Martinez v. 
Aero Caribbean,3 a Ninth Circuit case where general personal 
jurisdiction was not to exercised over a corporation conducting 
substantial business in the jurisdiction. Mr. Moreland replied BNSF is 
essentially a monopoly in Montana, dominating the competition posed by 
Montana Rail Link, a domestic railroad business. 
Branching off of this discussion, Mr. Moreland shifted to his 
consent argument. Immediately, the justices brought up the fact that 
consent was not raised as an issue below. Mr. Moreland admitted it was 
not explicitly argued, but consent is one of the bases for jurisdiction, and 
the general facts supporting consent were in the district court arguments. 
Counsel continued his argument, citing Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Mylan 
Inc.,4 a New Jersey case where a court found consent through the 
company’s business registration. Next, Mr. Moreland was asked how 
Montana’s registered agent statute fit into the consent argument.5 Mr. 
Moreland responded it was not just a registered agent that provided 
consent, but the service agent in conjunction with other actions a 
corporation takes when it wants to be a registered business in Montana. 
 
II. RANDY COX FOR APPELLEE 
 Though Mr. Cox began his argument with the applicability of 
Daimler AG v. Bauman,6 where the U.S. Supreme Court held 
corporations are typically only subject to general personal jurisdiction in 
the state of incorporation and the principal place of business, the Court 
quickly moved to preliminary questions. First the Court sought to clarify 
BNSF’s beliefs about specific personal jurisdiction. Mr. Cox assured the 
Court cases could still be brought in any state in which injury occurred. 
Next, Justice Shea posed a hypothetical involving a worker employed in 
Montana but injured in Idaho. Mr. Cox affirmed in such a situation the 
worker would not be able to bring suit in Montana state court under 
BNSF’s interpretation of specific jurisdiction, unless he or she could 
prove a part of the railroad’s negligence occurred in Montana. The Court 
wondered how BNSF can be prejudiced by defending a case in Montana, 
where BNSF has thousands of miles of railroad track, yet not prejudiced 
in Delaware, it’s state of incorporation, which has zero miles of track. 
Mr. Cox used this question to transition back to Daimler. Mr. Cox 
declared the nationwide applicability of Daimler in all cases, and the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s intention to do so. 
                                           
3 Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014). 
4 Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Mylan Inc., No. 14-4508, 2015 WL 1305764 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2015) 
5 MONT. CODE ANN. § 35–7–115(1) (2015) (stating “[t]he appointment or maintenance in this state 
of a registered agent does not by itself create the basis for personal jurisdiction over the represented 
entity in this state.”). 
6 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014). 
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Despite Mr. Cox’s turn to the applicability of Daimler, the Court 
seemed more eager to analyze the interaction between FELA and 
Daimler. Mr. Cox denied § 56’s ability to compel a state to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant. He proclaimed it would be 
unconstitutional to extend personal jurisdiction so far and cited cases 
where the state court at issue refused to do so. Using this as a cue, the 
justices initiated a barrage of questions concerning Miles v. Illinois Cent. 
R.R. Co.,7 a case where a Missouri state court had been forced to take a 
FELA case. Mr. Cox distinguished Miles as a case concerning subject 
matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction. Ultimately, Mr. Cox 
argued, even though Miles is factually alike the case here, it was decided 
before Daimler and is no longer good precedent. 
In his remaining time, Mr. Cox expressed a wish to discuss the 
consent argument. Mr. Cox informed the Court the registration form to 
conduct business in Montana is one page. He expressed doubt that 
signing a paper and registering an agent was enough to grant personal 
jurisdiction over a business. Mr. Moreland’s cases finding consent could 
not be used in Montana, Mr. Cox argued, because other states do not 
have the same statutes as Montana. Further on, he cited Ninth Circuit 
cases where consent jurisdiction had not been upheld over a registered 
corporation. 
III. MR. MORELAND’S REBUTTAL 
  The Court directed Mr. Moreland to begin his rebuttal with 
another look at the consent argument. Mr. Moreland bolstered the cases 
he cited earlier, while discounting the Ninth Circuit cases BNSF cited by 
saying one of the cases, N. Butte Mining Co. v. Tripp,8 was decided when 
a different statute was in effect. Mr. Moreland reiterated that consent is 
an independent basis for personal jurisdiction, and even without § 56, 
BNSF is subject to personal jurisdiction since it conducts business in 
Montana. 
Mr. Moreland also rehashed his argument that if § 56 confers 
personal jurisdiction to federal courts, it must be understood to confer the 
same jurisdiction to state courts. By arguing otherwise BNSF is 
mounting a constitutionality challenge to § 56; both sides, plus the 
justices, agree Congress had the ability to enact FELA under the 
commerce power. 
At the end of rebuttal, the Court returned to Daimler, referencing 
the comment that a lack of logic exists if a corporation is “at home” in 
every state in which it does business.9 Mr. Moreland responded it is not 
an overextension by hitting on two of his main points: Daimler is a non-
                                           
7 Miles v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 315 U.S. 698 (1948). 
8 N. Butte Mining Co. v. Tripp, 128 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1942). 
9 Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 761. 
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FELA case; and BNSF has been subject to personal jurisdiction in 
Montana for the past one hundred years, hence there cannot be an 
extension if the jurisdiction was exercised historically. 
 
IV. PREDICTIONS 
 Two critical queries likely must be resolved before the Court 
reaches the practical issues in the case. First, the Court will likely decide 
how FELA impacts a state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. Second, 
the Court will likely determine the scope of applicability for Daimler’s 
test regarding general personal jurisdiction. The Court will likely reserve 
a discussion of consent and whether BNSF is subject to general personal 
jurisdiction in Montana until after these two questions have been settled. 
The discussion concerning FELA will likely be the primary issue 
because it potentially may change or render moot the Daimler 
discussion. The Court faces a new issue here, because as both sides 
admitted, there does not seem to be any case dealing with the interaction 
of FELA and Daimler. Moreover, the Court appeared neutral in its 
consideration of the breadth and intent of § 56. The Court asked both 
sides multiple questions about § 56 which highlighted each position’s 
weak points. However, since the justices spent a large amount of time 
questioning both sides about other issues, it seems unlikely the Court will 
find the FELA argument dispositive. 
During Mr. Cox’s argument the justices seemed unconvinced 
that Daimler created a bright line rule. Daimler, which involved a 
defendant international corporation, is factually distinguishable from the 
defendant corporation here, but the justices did make sure to note the 
definition of a foreign corporation includes not only international 
corporations, but sister state corporations as well. There may be a divide 
in the justices regarding Daimler and its effects on Montana. Mr. Cox’s 
answer to the hypothetical presented during his argument seemed to 
disappoint Justice Shea, as Mr. Cox’s answer means a Montana worker 
cannot bring suit in Montana if he was not injured here. Nevertheless, 
another justice countered an argument put forth by Mr. Moreland by 
stating there is a continuing availability of state and federal forums, even 
if the Montana forum is lost in these types of cases. 
Though Tyrrell & Nelson did not raise the consent argument 
below, it seems likely the Court will address it in its decision. The 
justices were amendable to hearing consent arguments from both sides, 
and they even asked Mr. Moreland to address it in his rebuttal. 
Interestingly, the Court did not ask any questions about consent, except 
for one concerning Montana’s registered agent statute. This may signal 
the justices’ belief that consent does not grant jurisdiction in this 
particular case. 
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Lastly, the Court must decide whether BNSF is subject to 
general personal jurisdiction in Montana. When looking at BNSF’s 
business activities, the Court may compare BNSF’s activities in Montana 
to those nationwide or to domestic Montana businesses, such as Montana 
Rail Link. The Court will likely compare BNSF to domestic businesses, 
as Mr. Moreland argued for this comparison, and Mr. Cox failed to 
reintroduce the Daimler concept of looking at nationwide business 
activities. Still, the Court did bring up the Martinez case decided by the 
Ninth Circuit, where substantial business was not enough for personal 
jurisdiction. The Court may ultimately be more swayed by the Ninth 
Circuit precedent than by other arguments presented by counsel.  
 
